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Abstract
Under a worldwide tax system, firms pay taxes on their domestic income and
repatriated foreign income, whereas under a territorial tax system repatriated
foreign income is exempt from taxation. We examine whether worldwide tax
systems reduce the incentives of multinational corporations to engage in tax
management in their foreignsubsidiaries.Using twoquasi-natural experiments,we
show that multinationals lower the effective tax rates in their foreign subsidiaries
after countries switch from a worldwide to a territorial tax system. Thus,
multinationals subject to a worldwide tax system face competitive disadvantages
compared to competitors from countries with a territorial tax system.
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INTRODUCTION
When a multinational corporation (MNC) subject to a worldwide
tax system reduces taxes in its foreign subsidiaries, the parent
company will generally be subject to additional taxes when such
foreign earnings are repatriated. In light of additional home
country taxation upon repatriation, the worldwide tax system
may reduce the incentive for MNCs to manage taxes in their
foreign subsidiaries. In contrast, if the parent company of an MNC
is subject to a territorial tax system, the tax management behavior
of foreign subsidiaries does not affect the parent’s domestic tax
liabilities, and the MNC can reap the full benefit of reducing taxes
when repatriating foreign earnings. We investigate the tax man-
agement behavior of foreign subsidiaries depending on whether
they are owned by a parent company located in a country that has a
worldwide or territorial tax system (hereafter, worldwide-parent
subsidiary versus territorial-parent subsidiary).
There are several nuances that influence the incentive of MNCs
subject to a worldwide tax system to manage taxes in foreign
countries. First, worldwide tax systems usually offer the possibility
to defer taxation of foreign-source income until dividends are
repatriated. If MNCs reinvest foreign earnings and delay
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repatriation far in the future, the difference in tax
payments between a worldwide and a territorial tax
system shrinks in net present value terms if the
reinvestment rate of return of those tax savings is
greater than the discount rate. Furthermore, MNCs
might defer repatriation in anticipation of a tax
holiday or a change in the tax code. Second,
worldwide tax systems allow for cross-crediting,
which permits firms to offset repatriation taxes on
foreign earnings from low-tax subsidiary countries
with taxes paid in high-tax subsidiary countries.1
However, we expect that MNCs are less likely to
engage in tax management if the parent is located
in a worldwide tax system, and provide evidence
that tax management in foreign subsidiaries
increases after the switch to a territorial system.2
While evidence suggests that MNCs shift income
to countries with low tax rates (e.g., Akamah, Hope,
& Thomas, 2018; Beuselinck, Deloof, & Vanstrae-
len, 2015; Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Dyreng &
Lindsey, 2009; Klassen & Laplante, 2012; Newberry
& Dhaliwal, 2001), a significant amount of income
is taxed abroad. For example, US MNCs paid
US$128 billion in corporate income taxes abroad
on $470 billion of taxable income reported to
foreign tax authorities in 2010 (Tax Foundation,
2014). Thus, the average effective tax rate (ETR)
after income shifting on foreign taxable income was
27.2 percent.3 Conceptually, profit shifting and tax
management in foreign subsidiaries are different.
Profit shifting focuses on transactions between
group members that are influenced by transfer
prices, whereas tax management within foreign
subsidiaries focuses on the management behavior
of individual subsidiaries in light of country-speci-
fic tax rules.4 While prior research focuses on the
impact of a worldwide tax system on profit shifting
(Markle, 2016), the question whether, and if so to
what extent, tax systems influence MNCs to engage
in tax management in their foreign subsidiaries
remains unanswered. Answering this question is
important as foreign direct investments of MNCs
from countries with a worldwide tax system may be
disadvantaged compared to investments of MNCs
from countries with a territorial tax system due to
taxes that apply to dividend repatriations under a
worldwide tax system.
Generally, MNCs have the same costs and oppor-
tunities to manage taxes within their foreign
subsidiaries as resident companies in the respective
country. Examples documented in prior research
include minimizing non-deductible expenses,
exploiting domestically available favorable tax
regimes like patent boxes (Bornemann, Laplante,
& Osswald, 2019), and utilizing tax credits and tax
holidays (Shevlin, Tang, & Wilson, 2012). Within
the boundaries of the law, MNCs can agree in
advance on the tax treatment for business transac-
tions, as most European member states allow these
kinds of advance pricing agreements (European
Parliament, 2015). Furthermore, anecdotal media
evidence provides several examples of exploiting
loopholes in the domestic tax law (Balzli & Schiessl,
2009) and of choosing a location that minimizes
regional taxes and surcharges (Meisel & Schmidt,
2013; Mu¨llender, 2015). The costs associated with
domestic tax management are similar to those of
cross-country tax management, as firms have to
hire tax consultants, and established tax structures
might be challenged by tax authorities.
In particular, we study the tax management
behavior of worldwide-parent and territorial-parent
subsidiaries by investigating the switch in 2009 of
Japan and the UK from a worldwide to a territorial
tax system. Our sample consists of 39,496 sub-
sidiary–year observations in 19 European countries.
We obtain data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis
database and keep subsidiary–year observations
that are majority-owned by foreign parents from
58 countries ([ 50% ownership). The sample period
is 2006–2011, which comprises the 3 years before
and after Japan and the UK switched from a
worldwide to a territorial tax system. We compare
Japanese-owned and UK-owned foreign subsidiaries
before and after the tax system switch to two
control groups, worldwide-parent subsidiaries and
territorial-parent subsidiaries. Thus, our empirical
identification strategy relies on four difference-in-
differences analyses. This research design allows us
to establish a causal link between the tax system in
the MNC’s home country and the tax management
behavior of foreign subsidiaries (Reeb, Sakakibari, &
Mahmood, 2012).
Our difference-in-differences analyses show that
Japanese-owned subsidiaries reduced their ETRs by
2.6 (3.5) percentage points and UK-owned sub-
sidiaries reduced their ETRs by 1.2 (1.7) percentage
points compared to territorial-parent subsidiaries
(worldwide-parent subsidiaries). We conduct a wide
range of robustness tests and show that our results
hold when controlling for income shifting, home
country characteristics, aggregating all fully owned
foreign subsidiaries within a country-year, and
applying an entropy balancing to balance covari-
ates among treatment and control firms. Further-
more, we alternatively compute the ETR as tax
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expense deflated by total assets, which allows us to
include loss affiliates. Our results are robust to any
of these specifications.
We contribute to the literature on taxation of
MNCs and on the determinants that affect foreign
subsidiaries (e.g., Beuselinck & Pierk, 2019; Dunne
& Ndubizu, 1995; Klassen & Laplante, 2012; Liu &
Hsueh, 1993; Markle, 2016; Nguyen & Rugman,
2015). We provide evidence on the magnitude by
which tax management in foreign subsidiaries
increases after the switch to a territorial system.
This increase implies that MNCs subject to a
worldwide tax system face competitive disadvan-
tages compared to competitors from countries with
a territorial tax system when conducting cross-
border investments. Understanding whether tax
management in foreign subsidiaries is less preva-
lent under a worldwide tax system is important to
policymakers around the world for two reasons.
First, in 2017, 41 countries still applied a worldwide
tax system for foreign source dividends. Excluding
the US, the eight largest economies that applied a
worldwide tax system in 2017 were China, India,
Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Argentina,
and Taiwan.5 Thus, our findings help policymakers
to assess the costs and benefits of worldwide tax
systems. Second, with the passing of the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act (TCJA) in 2017, the US switched to a
territorial tax system for specific types of foreign
source income6 (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 2017),
which implies that US MNCs now have more
incentives to devise strategies to manage taxes in
their foreign subsidiaries.
Our findings are economically relevant for poli-
cymakers and tax authorities around the world. For
example, the US had $6.4 trillion outward foreign
direct investments (FDI) that generate taxable
income abroad (OECD, 2018b). Thus, if US-owned
subsidiaries manage taxes more after the TCJA, the
tax revenue of subsidiary countries is reduced.
Reduced tax revenues of US-owned subsidiaries
are especially relevant for countries with a high
ratio of US FDI, such as Canada, which exhibited
FDI of US$474 billion or 45.2 percent of all inward
FDI in 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017). Furthermore,
US MNCs reported $470 billion in taxable income
to foreign tax authorities in 2010 (Tax Foundation,
2014). If US MNCs reduce their ETRs in foreign
subsidiaries by between 1.2 and 3.5 percentage
points after the switch to a territorial tax system in
line with our findings, we expect them to save
between $5.64 billion (= 0.012 9 470 billion) and
16.45 billion (= 0.035 9 $470 billion) in foreign
corporate income taxes every year.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two
reviews prior literature and develops our hypothe-
sis. Section three explains the sample selection and
the research design. Section four contains the main
results, while section five contains robustness tests.
Section six presents conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW, BACKGROUND,
AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
International taxation is an ongoing concern of
policymakers around the world. Current interna-
tional taxation rules allocate taxing rights to the
country where companies report their profits. This
incentivizes MNCs to strategically locate sub-
sidiaries in low tax jurisdictions, although this
might be inefficient from a global value creation
point of view. Foss, Mudambi and Murtinu (2019)
therefore propose not to tax highly mobile corpo-
rate profits but instead to tax less mobile share-
holders and consumers. Other proposals brought
forward by academics are taxing worldwide profits
and allocating them based on the proportion of
sales to customers in each country (Ting & Gray,
2019), or based on a formula appointment that
reflects the corporate groups’ activity in each
country (McGaughey & Raimondos, 2019). How-
ever, even today, profits are not only taxed where
they are reported, as an additional layer of taxation
might occur when countries apply a worldwide tax
system.
A worldwide tax system imposes taxes on repa-
triated profits if the foreign tax burden on these
profits is lower than the tax burden in the home
country. This creates incentives to postpone repa-
triation or not to repatriate foreign profits at all.
This incentive increases with repatriation taxes and
decreases in the presence of domestic financial
constraints (Albring, Mills, & Newberry, 2011;
Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2007). In line with this,
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) find that
technology intensive firms in particular show a
higher sensitivity towards repatriation taxes. In the
case of no or low dividend repatriation taxes, MNCs
with fewer investment opportunities and higher
free cash flows repatriate profits (Blouin & Krull,
2009). More than 60 percent of the funds repatri-
ated following the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 were obtained from cash holdings abroad,
resulting in shareholder payouts for MNCs with
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strong corporate governance (Dharmapala, Foley, &
Forbes, 2011; Graham, Hanlon, & Shevlin, 2010).
Tax systems not only shape incentives for divi-
dend repatriation but also incentives for income
shifting. Overall, firms engage less in tax manage-
ment if a country has higher book-tax conformity,
a worldwide tax system, and stronger enforcement
(Atwood, Drake, Myers, & Myers, 2012). Similarly,
MNCs located in countries with a worldwide tax
system engage in less profit shifting (Markle, 2016).
This observation is concentrated among parent
companies and their foreign affiliates, whereas the
profit-shifting behavior does not differ among the
foreign affiliates of MNCs located in countries with
worldwide and territorial tax systems (Markle,
2016).
Desai et al. (2004) report that foreign affiliates
engage in more investments when they face lower
taxes. Prior literature has also shown that MNCs’
investment behavior differs depending on whether
the MNC is located in a country with a worldwide
tax system or a territorial tax system (Feld, Ruf,
Scheuering, Schreiber, & Voget, 2014; Hines, 1996;
Smart, 2010). Different investment behavior in turn
affects the non-debt shield (through depreciation)
and also the debt shield if these investments are
financed through debt (Dammon & Senbet, 1988;
DeAngelo & Masulis 1980).7
Between 2000 and 2012, the number of OECD
member countries which applied a territorial tax
system doubled (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013).
In line with this worldwide trend, the US abolished
the worldwide tax system for specific types of
foreign source income (see endnote 6) for fiscal
years ending after December 31, 2017, whereas
Japan and the UK abolished their worldwide tax
systems in 2009. In the sample period of this paper
(2006–2011), Japan and the UK were relatively high
tax countries, as they exhibited statutory corporate
income tax rates of 41 percent and 30 percent,8
respectively. Before switching to a territorial tax
system, the Japanese government was concerned
that MNCs kept a large portion of the profits earned
by their foreign affiliates abroad, which in turn
were not available to finance R&D investments in
Japan (Hasegawa & Kiyota, 2017). To stimulate
dividend repatriations, Japan introduced a foreign
dividend exemption system (i.e., a territorial tax
system for foreign dividends). The main reasons for
the UK to switch to a territorial system were to
improve the UK tax competitiveness and because
of a European Court of Justice judgment in Decem-
ber 2006 that made it more likely that a change to a
territorial tax system was necessary (Stuttaford,
2009).
Intuitively, if the average foreign tax burden is
lower than the statutory tax rate in the MNC’s
home country, MNCs subject to a worldwide tax
system will pay additional repatriation taxes (Sc-
holes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, &
Shevlin, 2015). Upon repatriation, they pay the
difference between the taxes paid in subsidiary
countries and the statutory tax rate in the MNC’s
home country. Thus, while tax management in
foreign subsidiaries may seem a tax-optimal strat-
egy, repatriation taxes eliminate this positive effect
and potentially lower the incentives to focus on tax
management in foreign affiliates in the first place.
However, there are two reasons why worldwide-
parent subsidiaries may also manage taxes. First,
the worldwide tax systems in Japan and the UK
allowed de facto balancing of dividend payments
from countries with high tax rates and dividend
payments from countries with low tax rates.9 Thus,
even though dividends from a low tax country
would result in additional repatriation taxes, the
tax liability would be (partly) offset by a de facto
refund for dividends from countries with a higher
tax rate. Second, worldwide tax systems offer the
possibility to defer additional home country taxa-
tion until dividends are repatriated, and MNCs
might hope for a tax holiday to circumvent repa-
triation taxes.
Nevertheless, Japanese and UK MNCs have fully
benefited from being tax aggressive abroad after the
tax system switch, as they are no longer subject to
additional repatriation taxes. If our reasoning
holds, we should observe that Japanese-owned
and UK-owned subsidiaries lowered their ETRs after
the two countries switched from a worldwide tax
system to a territorial tax system. This leads us to
our hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Foreign subsidiaries reduce their
ETRs after the MNC home country switches from
a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
We use unconsolidated financial statements of
private firms from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database,
which are the starting point for determining
taxable income in Europe and are amended by a
few country-specific tax rules. Our sample consists
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of European subsidiaries including their dynamic
ownership structure (from yearly Bureau van Dijk
downloads), for the years 2006–2011.10 This sample
period covers three years before and after Japan and
the UK switched to a territorial tax regime in
2009.11 We start with all subsidiary–year observa-
tions with available data on the global ultimate
owner between 2006 and 2011 and delete duplicate
observations in terms of shareholder, subsidiary,
and year combination.12 Furthermore, we delete
subsidiary–year observations with negative pre-tax
income in order to calculate the ETRs and delete
observations with missing data on net income, tax
expense, and missing control variables. The sample
includes only majority-owned (ownership[ 50%)
foreign subsidiaries in Europe because we consider
control of the foreign subsidiary vital for influenc-
ing business operations and financial decisions.
Furthermore, we require that we have at least one
observation in the pre-period and one observation
in the post-period for each foreign subsidiary. We
delete observations if the parent company is
located in a tax haven, because these firms might
have different incentives to manage taxes in for-
eign subsidiaries.13 Our sample includes only
Japanese-owned and UK-owned subsidiaries if the
statutory tax rate is higher than the statutory tax
rate of the subsidiary country, as additional repa-
triation taxes apply only in this case. Thus, we
make sure that firms had a reduced incentive to
manage taxes in the pre-period but the same
incentive as territorial firms in the post-period.14
This provides 39,496 subsidiary–year observations
from 19 subsidiary countries15 with parents from 58
countries.
Research Design
We investigate whether the average ETR of world-
wide-parent subsidiaries is higher than the average
ETR of territorial-parent subsidiaries. Our main
identification strategy is based on two difference-
in-differences analyses, as Japan and the UK
switched to a territorial tax system in 2009, and
we expect that Japanese-owned and UK-owned
subsidiaries reduced their ETR thereafter. We test
our hypothesis using two different control samples:
territorial-parent subsidiaries and worldwide-par-
ent subsidiaries. While 41 countries still had a
worldwide tax system in place in 2017, US-owned
subsidiaries account for most subsidiary-observa-
tions in the worldwide-parent control group.16 The
combination of two difference-in-differences anal-
yses using two different control samples provides us
with a powerful setting to test our hypothesis. We
use the following regression design for our tests:
ETRt ¼ b0 þ b1GBt  POST þ b2JP  POSTt þ b3GBt
þ b4JPt þ b5ROAt þ b6SIZEt þ b7EQUITYt
þ b8DIVt þ b9LAGLOSSt þ b10INTANGt
þ
XX
i¼11
bIFixed  effects þ et :
ð1Þ
The dependent variable for both difference-in-
differences designs is the generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) ETR. Several mea-
sures have been established to measure corporate
tax management: for example, book-tax differ-
ences, GAAP, and cash-ETRs, or tax shelter scores
(Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008; Lisowsky,
2010; Mills, 1998; Wilson, 2009). As we are inter-
ested in tax management of foreign subsidiaries
and cash-flow statements are only available for
publicly listed firms in Europe, we use GAAP ETRs
to measure corporate tax management (Armstrong,
Blouin, & Larcker, 2012; Chen, Chen, Cheng, &
Shevlin, 2010; Law & Mills, 2017; Lennox,
Lisowsky, & Pittman, 2013). Our dataset allows us
to identify the tax management behavior of Euro-
pean subsidiaries that would otherwise not be
possible, as financial statement information on
foreign subsidiaries is not available in consolidated
financial statements. We compute the GAAP ETR as
corporate income tax expense divided by pre-tax
income. The ETR of worldwide-parent subsidiaries
is, in the absence of cross-crediting, the basis for the
foreign tax credit granted by the MNC home
country with a worldwide tax system.17
Our main variables of interest are the interactions
of the indicator variables for Japanese-owned and
UK-owned subsidiaries with POST (b1 and b2). GB
(JP) takes on the value of one if the firm is majority-
owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs. POST takes on the
value of one for the period from 2009 to 2011 after
Japan and the UK switched to a territorial tax
system and zero otherwise. Note that we omit POST
in Formula (1) and in our tables, as we include
subsidiary-country–year fixed effects, which are
perfectly collinear with POST.18 We use the same
research design for the control sample of territorial-
parent subsidiaries and worldwide-parent sub-
sidiaries (i.e., Eq. 1). We predict that the coeffi-
cients of b1 and b2 will be negative for both control
samples. That is, Japanese-owned and UK-owned
subsidiaries show lower ETRs after the switch to a
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territorial tax system and thus manage taxes more
in the post-period.
As our sample consists of foreign subsidiaries, we
use control variables that are available for private
firms.19 We include return on assets (ROA) to proxy
for the subsidiaries’ profitability. We compute ROA
as pre-tax income divided by total assets. While
corporate income tax schedules of a few European
countries are progressive, we would not expect a
positive association between ROA and ETRs, as the
thresholds for a higher corporate income tax are
usually low (e.g., €200,000 of profits in the Nether-
lands). Conversely, profitability and ETRs may be
negatively associated, as more profitable firms have
more resources to engage in tax management. We
include size measured as the logarithm of total
assets (SIZE). Similar to profitability, size relates to
within-country tax management, as larger firms are
likely to have more resources to engage in tax
management. We control for capital-structure-re-
lated effects on tax management, as debt provides a
tax shield due to tax-deductible interest payments,
whereas equity does not (Graham, 2000; Graham &
Tucker, 2006; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015). Thus, we
control for the level of equity (EQUITY) and for
interactions with shareholders via dividend distri-
butions and equity capital injections from share-
holders in relation to total assets (DIV).
LAGLOSS is an indicator variable that takes on
the value of one if the firm had a negative pre-tax
income in the previous year. We include LAGLOSS
to control for the existence of tax loss carry-
forwards that may lower the ETR in the current
period when offset against the current period’s tax
base.20 INTANG is an indicator variable taking on
the value of one if the respective firm operates in an
intangible asset intensive industry. INTANG is
based on a classification by the European Patent
Office that classifies industries that are intellectual
property rights intensive (European Patent Office,
2013). We include INTANG to control for favorable
tax treatments for intangible assets that are also
available for domestic firms (e.g., patent boxes).
Finally, we include industry and subsidiary-coun-
try–year fixed effects. The subsidiary-country–year
fixed effects capture different investment prefer-
ences for particular subsidiary countries, country-
specific tax rate changes, and macro-economic
developments in each subsidiary country. We clus-
ter standard errors at the MNC home country level
to correct for correlation in the residuals arising
from multiple subsidiary–year observations belong-
ing to the same parent country. Clustering at the
firm level does not affect the statistical significance
of our results (untabulated).
RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the MNC home countries in rows
and subsidiary countries in columns. The abbrevi-
ations are the respective country ISO codes. In the
interest of readability, row ZZ contains all home
countries with fewer than 50 foreign subsidiary–
year observations in total, and column XX contains
all subsidiary countries with fewer than 500 sub-
sidiary–year observations in total. For example,
observation 16 in the upper left corner (row AT,
column BE) means that our sample includes 16
observations of subsidiaries owned by Austrian
parents located in Belgium. As our sample includes
only foreign-owned subsidiary observations, the
combinations of the same country in rows and
columns is always zero (e.g., BE/BE). The most
common combination is German-owned subsidiary
observations located in France (DE/FR: 1468). This
is not surprising as Germany is the largest economy
in Europe, France is the third largest economy, and
the countries are neighbors. In our sample, most
foreign subsidiary observations are owned by a
Swedish parent (SE/Sum: 5424), and most sub-
sidiaries are located in France (Sum/FR: 6858)0.21
Table 2 reports summary statistics. Approxi-
mately 10.3 percent of the subsidiary observations
in our sample are owned by MNCs from countries
with a worldwide tax system, 1.5 percent of the
subsidiary–year observations are Japanese-owned
and 5.2 percent are UK-owned. The average ETR
across all subsidiary observations is 31.5 percent.
ROA and SIZE show means of 0.145 and 15.965,
respectively. Furthermore, the subsidiary observa-
tions show an average equity ratio of 43.4 percent
of total assets (EQUITY) and 7.8 percent incurred a
loss in the previous period (LAGLOSS). Finally, 34.4
percent of the foreign subsidiary observations
operate in an intangible-assets-intensive industry
according to the classification of the European
Patent Office (INTANG).
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients
in the lower triangle and Spearman correlation
coefficients in the upper triangle. Since Japan and
the UK had a worldwide tax system in place in the
first three years of our sample, we find the Pearson
and Spearman correlation coefficients of JP and GB
to be significantly positively correlated with . The
Tax management of foreign subsidiaries Saskia Kohlhase and Jochen Pierk
Journal of International Business Studies
effective tax rate (ETR) is negatively correlated with
JP, but not statistically significantly correlated with
WW or GB.
Main Results
Results control sample I: Territorial-parent subsidiary
observations
In Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficients of the
interactions for Japanese-owned and UK-owned
subsidiary observations with POST (POST * GB
Table 1 Overview of sample
BE DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU NL NO PT SE XX Sum
AT 16 653 19 102 4 94 14 0 0 83 0 3 7 3 20 0 1018
AU 0 13 3 0 0 0 9 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 14 0 43
BE 0 253 38 252 40 1184 138 10 20 253 95 24 38 68 145 1 2559
CA 3 45 7 24 1 58 3 0 9 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 159
DE 239 0 351 1570 61 1468 174 14 63 421 75 27 133 112 133 11 4852
DK 147 299 0 251 283 280 142 6 15 120 5 57 846 43 835 13 3342
ES 100 131 22 0 10 477 81 28 28 303 0 27 25 1306 34 3 2575
FI 21 68 66 58 0 57 11 4 4 29 0 0 101 6 92 2 519
FR 860 538 83 1200 72 0 361 10 34 788 33 98 106 200 188 4 4575
GB 38 511 137 380 25 290 0 11 301 121 19 13 135 51 40 0 2072
IN 0 15 3 1 2 8 14 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 47
IS 0 3 12 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 32
IT 121 390 20 767 18 870 60 9 26 0 2 1 15 62 61 6 2428
JP 9 389 3 56 7 87 26 0 1 9 0 5 2 5 1 0 600
NL 867 1009 172 1073 96 744 215 18 92 395 34 0 259 91 174 0 5239
NO 16 57 165 54 15 46 20 7 8 14 1 0 0 5 40 4 452
PT 0 0 4 137 0 11 4 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 162
SE 223 274 749 214 1101 355 241 5 24 131 1 47 1980 73 0 6 5424
SI 3 15 7 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
US 182 580 184 505 77 739 148 9 97 243 27 13 133 38 115 10 3100
ZZ 2 80 11 38 6 77 15 2 6 8 0 5 4 2 2 4 262
Totals 2847 5323 2056 6687 1820 6858 1676 133 732 2923 294 320 3792 2067 1900 68 39,496
This table provides the locations of the MNC’s home country (origin of the respective parent) in rows and the location of the subsidiary in columns. The
abbreviations are the respective country ISO codes. XX contains all subsidiary countries with fewer than 500 observations. ZZ contains all home
countries with fewer than 50 observations. For example, the combination of AT/BE in the upper left corner (row/column) means that our sample contains
16 Austrian subsidiaries located in Belgium.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable n Mean SD P25 P50 P75
Main variables of interest
WW 39,496 0.103 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000
GB 39,496 0.052 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP 39,496 0.015 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000
ETR 39,496 0.315 0.160 0.252 0.299 0.358
Subsidiary controls
ROA 39,496 0.145 0.139 0.048 0.103 0.194
SIZE 39,496 15.965 1.863 14.703 15.929 17.131
EQUITY 39,496 0.434 0.254 0.230 0.413 0.625
DIV 39,496 0.062 0.156 -0.015 0.014 0.084
LAGLOSS 39,496 0.078 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.000
INTANG 39,496 0.344 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000
This table presents the descriptive statistics. WW takes on the value of one if the firm is majority-owned by a parent company located in a country with a
worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise; GB (JP) takes on the value of one if the firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs, and zero otherwise;
ETR is the GAAP effective tax rate; ROA is the pre-tax income divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; EQUITY is the ratio of
equity to total assets; LAGLOSS is coded one if the pre-tax earnings were negative in the previous year, and zero otherwise; INTANG is coded one if the
firm operates in an intangible asset intensive industry, and zero otherwise. All non-dichotomous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
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and POST * JP) are statistically significant. Japa-
nese-owned subsidiaries reduced their ETR by 2.6
percentage points in the post-period
(p value\ 0.001, 95% conf. interval between
- 3.3 and - 1.9 percentage points). Similarly, UK-
owned subsidiaries engaged in more tax manage-
ment after the tax system change and reduced their
ETR by 1.2 percentage points (p value\0.001, 95%
conf. interval between - 1.9 and - 0.6 percentage
points). Overall, the results are in line with our
hypothesis when using territorial-parent subsidiary
observations as our control sample.
Results control sample II: Worldwide-parent
subsidiary observations
In Model 2 of Table 4, we use the same research
design but use worldwide-parent subsidiary obser-
vations as a control group. Our hypothesis predicts
that Japanese-owned and UK-owned subsidiaries
reduced their ETRs for the post-period. In line with
Table 3 Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) WW 0.12* 0.17* 0.00 0.00 0.10* 0.07* - 0.05* - 0.02* 0.02*
(2) GB 0.12* - 0.03* - 0.05* - 0.00 0.02* 0.05* 0.02 0.01 - 0.03*
(3) JP 0.17* - 0.03* 0.02* - 0.04* 0.08* 0.03* - 0.03* - 0.01* 0.04*
(4) ETR 0.00 - 0.04* 0.00 - 0.07* 0.00 - 0.15* - 0.08* - 0.09* 0.04*
(5) ROA 0.00 0.00 - 0.04* - 0.11* - 0.16* 0.25* 0.35* - 0.14* 0.06*
(6) SIZE 0.10* 0.01 0.07* - 0.03* - 0.17* - 0.05* - 0.03* - 0.04* 0.04*
(7) EQUITY 0.07* 0.05* 0.02* - 0.17* 0.18* - 0.04* - 0.02* - 0.11* 0.05*
(8) DIV - 0.03* 0.03* - 0.03* - 0.09* 0.50* - 0.08* 0.03* - 0.11* 0.01
(9) LAGLOSS - 0.02* 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.06* - 0.09* - 0.04* - 0.11* - 0.10* - 0.01*
(10) INTANG 0.02* - 0.03* 0.04* 0.03* 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 - 0.01*
This table presents Pearson correlations in the lower triangle and Spearman correlations in the upper triangle. WW takes on the value of one if the firm is
majority-owned by a parent company located in a country with a worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise; GB (JP) takes on the value of one if the firm
is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs, and zero otherwise; ETR is the GAAP effective tax rate; ROA is the pre-tax income divided by total assets; SIZE
is ithe natural logarithm of total assets; EQUITY is the ratio of equity (dividends minus newly provided equity) to total assets; LAGLOSS is coded one if the
pre-tax earnings were negative in the previous year, and zero otherwise; INTANG is coded one if the firm operates in an intangible asset intensive
industry, and zero otherwise. All non-dichotomous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
*Significant at the 1% level.
Table 4 Regression analyses of effective tax rates
Dep. Var. ETR (1) Control: Territorial countries (2) Control: Worldwide countries
Coef. SE Coef. SE
GB * POST - 0.012 (0.003) - 0.017 (0.003)
JP * POST - 0.026 (0.003) - 0.035 (0.005)
GB 0.013 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
JP 0.017 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003)
ROA - 0.077 (0.013) - 0.050 (0.051)
SIZE - 0.006 (0.001) - 0.002 (0.001)
EQUITY - 0.082 (0.007) - 0.084 (0.013)
DIV - 0.032 (0.007) - 0.035 (0.033)
LAGLOSS - 0.050 (0.004) - 0.079 (0.007)
INTANG 0.009 (0.003) 0.001 (0.006)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes
Ind.-FE Yes Yes
N 36,294 5874
R-squared 0.179 0.224
The dependent variable is the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR). GB (JP) takes on the value of one if the firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs. POST
takes on the value of one for the years 2009–2011. Please note that POST is omitted in our tables, as it is perfectly collinear with the country-year fixed
effects. ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets. DIV can take
on negative and positive values, where negative values are new equity contributions to the foreign subsidiary and positive values are dividend payments
by the foreign subsidiary. LAGLOSS is coded one if the pre-tax earnings were negative in the previous year. All non-dichotomous variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the MNC’s home country level and provided in brackets next to the coefficients.
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our hypothesis, Japanese-owned subsidiaries
reduced their tax rates by 3.5 percentage points
[p value\0.001, 95% confidence interval (CI)
between - 4.6 and - 2.4 percentage points]. Sim-
ilarly, UK-owned subsidiaries reduced their tax rates
by 1.7 percentage points (p value\0.001, 95% CI
between - 2.3 and - 1.1 percentage points).
The average effective tax rate of Japanese (UK)-
owned subsidiaries was 33.0 percent (27.0%) in the
pre-period. In relative terms, the percentage point
reduction for Japanese-owned subsidiaries ranged
between 7.8 percent (- 2.6/33.0) and 10.6 percent
(- 3.5/33). For UK-owned subsidiaries, the relative
reduction ranged between 4.4 percent (- 1.2/27)
and 6.2 percent (- 1.7/27). Overall, the results are
in line with our hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that
Japanese-owned and UK-owned subsidiaries engage
more in tax management after a switch from a
worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system as
the interactions (GB 9 POST and JP 9 POST) are
statistically significantly negative in both samples.
Turning to the control variables, we find that the
coefficient for ROA is significantly negative in
Column 1 but not in Column 2. Similarly, SIZE is
negatively related to the ETR in Column 1, which
could be explained by higher resources and abilities
to manage taxes. However, the coefficient in
Column 2 is not statistically significant. Higher
equity payments are negatively related to the ETRs.
DIV shows a statistically significantly negative
coefficient in column 1 and an insignificant coef-
ficient in column 2. A loss in the previous period
(LAGLOSS) is negatively correlated with ETR, as tax
loss carry-forwards may be offset against the cur-
rent year’s taxable income.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND ADDITIONAL
RESULTS
Entropy Balancing: Country by Country
In Table 5, we use entropy balancing to balance the
covariates between the treatment and control
observations (Hainmueller, 2012). Furthermore,
we separately run the analyses for Japanese-owned
and UK-owned subsidiary observations. The
entropy balancing reweights the dataset by adjust-
ing differences between treatment and control
observations based on the first and second
moment. Appendix 2 shows the mean and variance
of all covariates for all subsamples before and after
the entropy balancing. Before balancing (i.e., for
the original sample), mean and variance of the
covariates were different for the treatment and
control observations, whereas after balancing there
was no statistical difference between treatment and
control observations. We use the entropy balanced
sample and re-run our main analyses separately for
Japanese-owned and for UK-owned observations.
The results of Table 5 are similar to those of our
main analyses in Table 4. UK-owned subsidiaries
engaged in more tax management and reduced
their ETR between 1.1 percentage points (Column
1: p value 0.005) and 1.5 percentage points
(Column 2: p value 0.025). Japanese-owned sub-
sidiaries reduced their ETR between 2.2 percentage
points (Column 3: p value 0.002) and 2.9 percent-
age points (Column 4: p value 0.009). This corrob-
orates our previous findings and is in line with our
hypothesis.
Deflating by Total Assets
In line with prior literature (e.g., Dyreng et al.,
2008; Gallemore & Labro, 2015), the sample does
not include observations with negative pre-tax
income as ETRs deflated by pre-tax income are
not meaningful for those observations. As this
sample selection can affect our results, we alterna-
tively calculate the ETR as tax expense divided by
total assets, instead of pre-tax income. Because total
assets are strictly positive, we are also able to
include all firms with negative pre-tax income.
Table 6 uses the same research design as before
but the dependent variable is the ETR using total
assets as a deflator. The statistically significant
negative coefficients of GB 9 POST and JP 9 POST
(all p values are below 0.01) confirm our findings
that Japanese-owned and UK-owned subsidiaries
engage in more tax management after the switch to
a territorial tax system.
Profit Shifting
This paper focuses on tax management within
foreign subsidiaries. Thus, our results could poten-
tially be affected by profit shifting. Markle (2016),
for example, finds that MNCs from countries with a
worldwide tax system engage in less profit shifting.
Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman (2018) find that foreign
firms are more profitable in tax havens but less
profitable in non-haven countries. To address this
concern, we delete subsidiaries located in a tax
haven for our analyses. Unreported analyses yield
similar results when we include those subsidiaries.
However, if MNCs from countries with a worldwide
tax system shift most profits to low tax countries,
they may not engage less in tax management in the
Tax management of foreign subsidiaries Saskia Kohlhase and Jochen Pierk
Journal of International Business Studies
subsidiary country, and we should observe lower
pre-tax profits for worldwide-parent subsidiaries.
Thus, we regress pre-tax income (ROA) on WW and
control variables including fixed effects for industry
and subsidiary-country–year combinations. On
average across all subsidiary countries, we find a
positive, but statistically insignificant, coefficient
for WW in Model 1 (p value 0.247). This implies
that subsidiary observations with parents from
worldwide tax regimes have higher pre-tax income
and are thus less likely to shift income out of
Europe, which is consistent with the findings of
Markle (2016). We find mixed results when we split
WW into indicator variables for Japanese-owned
and UK-owned subsidiary observations. For
WW 9 GB we find an insignificantly negative
coefficient (p value 0.105) and for WW 9 JP a
significantly negative coefficient (p value\0.001).
Thus, our results suggest only Japanese-owned
subsidiaries have lower pre-tax profits, which may
imply that they shift more profits to low tax
countries than territorial-parent subsidiaries. Over-
all, we conclude that profit shifting is unlikely to
drive our results as we do not find a consistent
pattern for countries with a worldwide tax regime
(Table 7).
Consolidation
Some European countries allow consolidation of
profitable and non-profitable subsidiaries for tax
purposes. To account for this possibility, we aggre-
gate all fully-owned foreign subsidiary observations
of an ultimate parent company per country–year
and treat this as one observation (Huizinga &
Laeven, 2008; Markle, 2016).22 This also has the
benefit of including more loss subsidiary observa-
tions within a given country–year, as we only
require the country–year aggregate of all entities
Table 5 Regression analyses of effective tax rates: country-by-country, entropy balanced
Dep. Var. ETR UK Japan
Pred. TT WW Pred. TT WW
GB * POST – - 0.011 - 0.015
(0.004) (0.005)
GB 0.014 0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
JP * POST - - 0.022 - 0.029
(0.007) (0.009)
JP 0.002 - 0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
ROA - 0.103 - 0.078 - 0.062 - 0.050
(0.011) (0.040) (0.010) (0.029)
SIZE - 0.005 - 0.002 - 0.010 - 0.007
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004)
EQUITY - 0.081 - 0.072 - 0.098 - 0.086
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
DIV - 0.014 - 0.025 - 0.013 - 0.013
(0.013) (0.029) (0.013) (0.030)
LAGLOSS - 0.056 - 0.074 - 0.064 - 0.079
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
INTANG 0.012 0.006 - 0.007 - 0.009
(0.002) - 0.078 (0.007) (0.006)
Country–Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind.-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 35,980 5588 35,748 4348
R-squared 0.194 0.228 0.174 0.209
The table includes the entropy balanced sample. The summary statistics of the samples before and after entropy balancing can be found in Appendix 2.
TT uses territorial-owned subsidiaries as control group and WW uses worldwide-parent subsidiaries as control group; The dependent variable is the GAAP
effective tax rate (ETR); GB (JP) takes on the value of one if the firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs; POST takes on the value of one for the
years 2009–2011; note that POST is omitted in our tables, as it is perfectly collinear with the country–year fixed effects; ROA is pre-tax income divided by
total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets; DIV can take on negative and positive values, where
negative values are new equity contributions to the foreign subsidiary and positive values are dividend payments by the foreign subsidiary; LAGLOSS is
coded one if the pre-tax earnings were negative in the previous year. All non-dichotomous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the MNC’s home country level and provided in parentheses.
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owned by one ultimate owner to be profitable to
compute ETRs. Although we do not have reason to
believe that consolidation rules are systematically
different between territorial- and worldwide-parent
subsidiary observations, we repeat our analyses
with the aggregated observations. The results in
Table 8 are qualitatively the same as in Table 4,
suggesting that consolidation of foreign subsidiary
observations does not influence our results (p values
of variables of interest\ 0.001). Overall, the results
obtained on aggregated observations of fully-
owned foreign subsidiaries support our hypothesis
that foreign subsidiaries reduce their ETRs after the
Table 6 Regression analyses of effective tax rates (deflated by total assets)
Dep. Var. ETR_TA (1) Control: Territorial countries (2) Control: Worldwide countries
Pred. Coef. SE Pred. Coef. SE
GB * POST – - 0.002 (0.001) – - 0.002 (0.001)
JP * POST – - 0.004 (0.000) – - 0.004 (0.000)
GB 0.004 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
JP 0.002 (0.001) - 0.002 (0.000)
ROA 0.196 (0.008) 0.178 (0.009)
SIZE - 0.002 (0.000) - 0.003 (0.000)
EQUITY - 0.015 (0.001) - 0.017 (0.002)
DIV 0.011 (0.002) 0.017 (0.001)
LAGLOSS 0.005 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001)
INTANG 0.001 (0.000) 0.002 (0.001)
Country–Year FE Yes Yes
Ind.-FE Yes Yes
n 43,690 7058
R-squared 0.523 0.483
The dependent variable is the GAAP effective tax rate calculated as tax expense divided by total assets (ETR_TA). GB (JP) takes on the value of one if the
firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs; POST takes on the value of one for the years 2009–2011; note that POST is omitted in our tables, as it is
perfectly collinear with the country–year fixed effects; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets; DIV can
take on negative and positive values, where negative values are new equity contributions to the foreign subsidiary and positive values are dividend
payments by the foreign subsidiary; LAGLOSS is coded one if the pre-tax earnings were negative in the previous year. All non-dichotomous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the MNC’s home country level and provided in parentheses.
Table 7 Regression analyses of pre-tax profits
Dep. Var. ROA (1) (2)
Coef. SE Coef. SE
WW 0.004 (0.004) 0.007 (0.001)
WW * GB - 0.003 (0.002)
WW * JP - 0.034 (0.002)
SIZE - 0.009 (0.001) - 0.009 (0.001)
EQUITY 0.101 (0.005) 0.101 (0.005)
DIV 0.451 (0.016) 0.451 (0.016)
LAGLOSS - 0.011 (0.002) - 0.011 (0.002)
INTANG 0.006 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003)
Country-Year-FE Yes Yes
Ind.-FE Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes
n 39,496 39,496
R-squared 0.337 0.337
This table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variable is ROA, which is pre-tax income divided by total assets; WW takes on the value of one if
the firm is majority-owned by a parent company located in a country with a worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise; WW 9 GB (WW 9 JP) takes on
the value of one if the firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs when a worldwide tax system was in place in the respective country, and zero
otherwise; EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets; DIV can take on negative and positive values, where negative values are new equity contributions
to the foreign subsidiary and positive values are dividend payments by the foreign subsidiary; LAGLOSS is coded one if the pre-tax earnings were
negative in the previous year. All non-dichotomous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the MNC’s
home country level and provided in brackets next to the coefficients.
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MNC home country switches from a worldwide tax
system to a territorial tax system.
Parent-Country Control Variables
The economic situation in the home country of the
MNC parent company can potentially influence the
tax management strategy of the parent company
and its subsidiaries abroad. Hence, in untabulated
results, we use yearly macro-economic indicators
obtained from the World Bank for each MNC home
country to control for incentives that arise due to
the respective economic situations (World Bank,
2017). Similar to Markle (2016), we include the
yearly change in gross domestic product (GDP) to
control for economic growth in the MNC’s home
country. Furthermore, we control for the market
capitalization in percent of GDP to proxy for the
importance of the stock market. We control for the
financial resources provided to the private sector by
financial institutions as a percentage of the MNC’s
home country’s GDP to proxy for financing possi-
bilities. Similarly, we include the distance between
the parent home country and the subsidiary coun-
try to proxy for unobservable transaction costs
increasing with the distance between the parent
home country and the subsidiary country (Ander-
son, 2011). Untabulated results show that includ-
ing these variables does not change our results and
none of the variables shows statistical significance.
Parallel Trend Assumptions
In Table 9, we show that the parallel trends
assumption holds. First, we create indicator vari-
ables for all but one year of our sample period and
interact them with indicator variables for JP and
GB. We omit 2006 as the baseline category to avoid
perfect collinearity. The variable TREAT represents
the indicator variable JP or GB, respectively. For
Japan, we find statistically significant negative coef-
ficients for 2007 (p values\0.001) and statistically
significant positive coefficients for 2008 (p val-
ues\0.01). The statistically significant positive
coefficients in 2008 suggest that Japanese MNCs
only started to manage taxes more in foreign
subsidiaries as of 2009 (all p values\0.01). The
coefficients for UK-owned subsidiaries are mostly
statistically insignificant in the pre-period and in
one case even positive (Column 1: coefficient
0.011, p value 0.046) and are statistically signifi-
cantly negative as from 2009 (all p values\ 0.01,
except the p value for TREAT * 2011 is 0.031 in
column 1). Thus, the table shows the parallel trend
assumption holds for UK-owned subsidiaries.
In line with our hypothesis, all coefficients for
Japanese-owned and UK-owned subsidiaries render
statistically significantly negative in the post-period
from 2009 to 2011. Overall, we conclude that
Japanese-owned and British-owned subsidiaries
started to manage taxes more after the two coun-
tries switched to a territorial tax system, but not
before.23
Table 8 Regression analyses of effective tax rates: Consolidated sample
Dep. Var. ETR (1) Control: Territorial countries (2) Control: Worldwide countries
Pred. Coef. SE Pred. Coef. SE
GB * POST – - 0.015 (0.003) – - 0.014 (0.002)
JP * POST – - 0.021 (0.004) – - 0.026 (0.004)
GB 0.012 (0.003) - 0.001 (0.002)
JP 0.013 (0.003) 0.007 (0.003)
ROA - 0.069 (0.014) - 0.062 (0.036)
SIZE - 0.006 (0.001) - 0.002 (0.001)
EQUITY - 0.077 (0.008) - 0.079 (0.015)
DIV - 0.031 (0.007) - 0.026 (0.025)
LAGLOSS - 0.049 (0.004) - 0.074 (0.007)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes
n 36,645 5924
R-squared 0.181 0.229
The dependent variable is the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR). Observations are aggregated within ultimate owner, country and year; GB (JP) takes on the
value of one if the firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs; POST takes on the value of one for the years 2009–2011; note that POST is omitted in
our tables, as it is perfectly collinear with the country-year fixed effects; ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets; EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets; DIV can take on negative and positive values, where negative values are new equity contributions
to the foreign subsidiary and positive values are dividend payments by the foreign subsidiary; LAGLOSS is coded one if the pre-tax earnings were
negative in the previous year. All non-dichotomous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the MNC’s home
country level and provided in brackets next to the coefficients.
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CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the impact of a worldwide
tax system in the MNC’s home country on the tax
management behavior of foreign subsidiaries. We
find that worldwide-parent subsidiary observations
show statistically and economically significantly
higher ETRs than territorial-parent subsidiary
observations. In line with our hypothesis, we find
that worldwide-parent subsidiaries reduce their
ETRs after a worldwide tax system was abolished.
We argue that our findings are due to the additional
repatriation tax levied on dividend distributions of
worldwide-parent subsidiaries when profits are
repatriated.
Our contribution to the existing literature is
twofold. First, we provide evidence on the magni-
tude by which tax management in foreign sub-
sidiaries increases if the home country of the
MNC’s parent company switches from a worldwide
to a territorial tax system. This contributes to the
literature by identifying the effect of a worldwide
tax system on tax management in foreign sub-
sidiaries. Taxing MNCs based on their worldwide
profits leads to a reduced profitability of their
foreign subsidiaries, because worldwide-parent sub-
sidiaries engage less in tax management than
territorial-parent subsidiaries. This has not only
consequences when repatriating foreign profits, but
also for investment and reinvestments decision of
foreign subsidiaries abroad. Our results show that
foreign direct investments of MNCs from countries
with a worldwide tax system are disadvantaged
compared to investments of MNCs from countries
with a territorial tax system. Switching from a
worldwide to a territorial tax system lowers the
ETRs in the foreign affiliates which in turn incen-
tivizes firms to invest more in those affiliates.
Additionally, the change to a territorial tax system
might impact the optimal financing structure of
MNCs and their affiliates as a decrease in the ETR
impacts the debt shield.
Second, our results show the impact of the recent
switch to a territorial tax system in the US (TCJA
2017), and indicate that foreign subsidiaries of US
MNCs will likely engage in more tax management
after the switch. This finding is especially relevant
for tax authorities of countries with a high number
of US foreign direct investments, as more tax
management of US MNCs in foreign subsidiaries
generates less tax revenue in the subsidiary coun-
try. We estimate that US MNCs will generate
foreign corporate income tax savings of between
$5.64 billion and $16.45 billion per year after
Table 9 Regression analyses of effective tax rates: Parallel trends
Dep. Var. ETR UK Japan
Prediction TT WW Prediction TT WW
TREAT * 2007 0.011 - 0.000 - 0.029 - 0.039
(0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
TREAT * 2008 - 0.008 - 0.004 0.014 0.017
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
TREAT * 2009 – - 0.013 - 0.018 – - 0.017 - 0.026
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
TREAT * 2010 – - 0.024 - 0.028 – - 0.034 - 0.039
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.011)
TREAT * 2011 – - 0.010 - 0.020 – - 0.057 - 0.064
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
TREAT 0.016 0.007 0.021 0.013
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country–Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind.-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 35,694 5274 34,222 3802
R-squared 0.181 0.234 0.178 0.238
The dependent variable is the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR). TT uses territorial-owned subsidiaries as control group and WW uses worldwide-parent
subsidiaries as control group; TREAT takes on the value of one if the firm is majority-owned by UK (Japanese) MNCs; 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
are yearly dummy variables; standard errors are clustered at the MNC’s home country level and provided in parentheses.
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switching to a territorial tax system due to the TCJA
2017. Overall, our results are informative for coun-
tries that still operate a worldwide tax system and
for countries that recently switched to a territorial
tax system.
As tax laws vary, the costs and opportunities to
reduce taxes in the respective affiliate countries
differ from country to country. Often, the respec-
tive laws and regulations are only available in the
local language. Thus, we encourage local research-
ers to conduct thorough investigations into coun-
try-specific tax legislation.
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NOTES
1Under cross-crediting, firms can time dividend
repatriations such that the repatriation tax burden
on dividend payments from countries with tax
rates above and below the statutory tax rate in the
MNC’s home country offset each other. This prac-
tice either minimizes or completely avoids repatri-
ation taxes on foreign dividends.
2While deferring repatriation leads to deferring
repatriation taxes, there are exceptions of the rule.
In the US, subpart F is such an exception. Income
subject to subpart F (e.g., dividends, interest, roy-
alties) of a controlled foreign corporation would be
taxed as if it had been repatriated immediately
instead of waiting for the actual repatriation by the
controlled foreign corporation.
3The average corporate income tax rates includ-
ing sub-central government taxes across OECD
member countries amounts to 25.5% in 2010 and
to 24.2% in 2017 (OECD, 2018a).
4Beuselinck and Pierk (2019) show that tax
avoidance in foreign subsidiaries significantly con-
tributes to MNCs’ overall tax avoidance, and that
tax avoidance in foreign subsidiaries serves as a
substitute for profit shifting.
5Using the EY worldwide corporate tax guides, we
checked 115 countries across the globe whether
they applied a worldwide or a territorial tax system
in 2017. The following countries applied a world-
wide tax system in 2017: Argentina, Belarus, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador,
Egypt, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nigeria, Pak-
istan, Peru, Philippines, Serbia, South Korea, Syrian
Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
6The TCJA 2017 introduced a territorial tax
system for profits up to 10 percent per year of the
depreciable physical assets. Furthermore, the TCJA
lowered the corporate income tax to 21 percent for
fiscal years ending after December 31, 2017.
Income above the 10 percent threshold is taxed
immediately at half the US corporate income tax
rate (i.e. 10.5 percent) with a credit for 80 percent
of foreign taxes paid (Tax Policy Center, 2016). The
21 percent corporate income tax rate and a 100
percent tax credit for foreign income taxes apply to
income from passive assets under subpart F.
7While DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) predict a
negative correlation between non-debt tax shields
and the use of debt, there can also be a positive
correlation if investments of profitable firms are
financed through debt (Dammon & Senbet, 1988).
For more details, we refer the reader to the review
on taxes and corporate taxes of Graham (2003).
8The UK lowered its statutory corporate income
tax rate to 28% as from April 1, 2008 and now has a
corporate income tax rate of 19%.
9UK MNCs could de facto balance the repatria-
tion tax burden across dividend payments from
countries with tax rates above and below 30% using
foreign holding companies that pool income
streams of foreign subsidiaries.
10Our results are more pronounced when we do
not include the transition year 2009. Therefore, our
results can be interpreted as a lower bound
estimate.
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11We do not extend the sample period because
there was no change in the statutory tax rate in
Japan between 2006 and 2011. However, there was
an increase in 2005 and a decrease in 2012.
Similarly, the UK decreased its tax rate in 2012.
Thus, we do not capture incentives that are related
to tax rate changes in the parent country. There was
also a slight decrease in the statutory tax rate by 2
percentage points in the UK from 2007 to 2008. In
untabulated results, we only used 2008 as the pre-
period, thus holding the statutory tax rate con-
stant, and our results remain qualitatively the
same.
12We focus on the global ultimate owner in our
analyses, as funds ultimately need to be available to
the global ultimate owner. If we use the direct
owner instead, the results remain qualitatively the
same as the global ultimate owner is also the direct
owner in the majority of the cases.
13Tax havens are defined based on Gravelle
(2009). In untabulated tests, we find that our
results are not sensitive to including these
observations.
14Our results are not sensitive to these sample
restrictions.
15The subsidiaries included in our final sample
are located in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, and
Sweden.
16The US had a worldwide tax system in place
during our whole sample period.
17Incorporating dividend withholding taxes has
no effect on either our hypotheses or our empirical
tests. Due to the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive
(Council Directive 90/435/EEC), no dividend-with-
holding taxes apply for repatriations to the UK.
Furthermore, Japanese income tax treaties lower
dividend-withholding taxes to 0%, 5%, or 10%
depending on the country. In the case of Japanese-
owned companies, dividend-withholding taxes
amount to 0% for Irish subsidiaries, 5% for
subsidiaries located in France and Norway, and to
10% in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Spain, and Sweden.
18The country–year fixed effects also capture
other country–year specific institutional changes
such as the level of corruption in the subsidiary
country. In unreported results, we split our sample
based on the corruption level in the subsidiary
country and find statistical significant results in
both sub-samples. For UK-owned subsidiaries the
magnitude of the coefficients is of similar size,
whereas we find a more negative coefficient for
Japanese-owned subsidiaries in high corruption
countries.
19As we use private firm data from Bureau van
Dijk, some variables that have been identified to
explain tax management are not available (e.g.,
market-to-book).
20The actual amounts of tax-loss carry-back and
carry-forward are not observable.
21The most subsidiary observations in our sample
are located in France (6858) and most parents are
located in Sweden (5424). Generally, our results are
not sensitive to excluding specific countries. In
unreported regressions, we show that our findings
are only marginally affected if we exclude, for
example, all Swedish subsidiaries. Results are also
similar for other cuts of the data.
22We focus on fully owned foreign subsidiaries, as
the thresholds to consolidate subsidiaries for tax
purposes vary across countries (e.g., 50% share-
holding in Germany and 95% shareholding in the
Netherlands).
23In untabulated results, we compute the average
ETRs for the pre-period for Japanese-owned and
UK-owned subsidiaries and calculate what fraction
of these subsidiaries decreased their ETR in the
post-period. We found that 64.3% of Japanese-
owned subsidiaries decreased their ETRs in 2009,
75.6% in 2010, and 73.3% in 2011, and that 76.9%
of UK-owned subsidiaries decreased their ETRs in
2009, 76.2% in 2010, and 82.5% in 2011.
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APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Dependent variables
ETR Corporate income tax expense divided by pre-tax income
ROA Pre-tax income divided by total assets
Main variables of interest
GB Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a subsidiary is majority-owned by UK shareholders
JP Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a subsidiary is majority-owned by Japanese shareholders
POST Indicator variable that takes on the value of one for the years 2009–2011
WW Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a subsidiary is majority-owned by shareholders from a country with a
worldwide tax system and zero if majority-owned by shareholders from a country with a territorial tax system
Control variables
DIV DIV can take on negative and positive values, where negative values are new equity contributions to the foreign subsidiary
and positive values are dividend payments by the foreign subsidiary
EQUITY Equity divided by total assets
INTANG Indicator variable taking on the value of one if the subsidiary operates in an intangible-asset-intensive industry based on a
classification by the European Patent Office (2013)
LAGLOSS Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the subsidiary had a negative pre-tax income in the previous year
ROA Pre-tax income divided by total assets
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (measured in US Dollars)
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APPENDIX 2: SAMPLES BEFORE AND AFTER ENTROPY BALANCING
Original sample Entropy balanced sample
Treat Control Treat Control
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
Panel A: UK—territorial sample
ROA 0.15 0.02*** 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02
SIZE 16.06*** 3.41 15.90 3.47 16.06 3.41 16.06 3.41
EQUITY 0.49*** 0.08*** 0.43 0.06 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.08
DIV 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04
LAGLOSS 0.09 0.08*** 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
INTANG 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.34 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.20
Panel B: UK—worldwide sample
ROA 0.15** 0.02*** 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02
SIZE 16.06*** 3.41** 16.55 3.14 16.06 3.41 16.06 3.41
EQUITY 0.49 0.08* 0.49 0.07 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.08
DIV 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04
LAGLOSS 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
INTANG 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.39 0.24 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.20
Panel C: Japan—territorial sample
ROA 0.10*** 0.01*** 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01
SIZE 17.11*** 1.67*** 15.90 3.46 17.11 1.67 17.15 1.67
EQUITY 0.48*** 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.48 0.06 0.48 0.06
DIV 0.03*** 0.01** 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
LAGLOSS 0.06* 0.06** 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
INTANG 0.51*** 0.25* 0.34 0.22 0.51 0.25 0.51 0.25
Panel D: Japan—worldwide sample
ROA 0.10*** 0.01*** 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01
SIZE 17.11*** 1.67*** 16.44 3.37 17.11 1.67 17.11 1.68
EQUITY 0.48 0.06*** 0.49 0.07 0.48 0.06 0.48 0.06
DIV 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
LAGLOSS 0.06 0.06** 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
INTANG 0.51*** 0.25 0.36 0.23 0.51 0.25 0.51 0.25
ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets; DIV can take on
negative and positive values, where negative values are new equity contributions to the foreign subsidiary and positive values are dividend payments by
the foreign subsidiary; LAGLOSS is coded one if the pre-tax earnings were negative in the previous year
***/**/* mark significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels of a t test (F test) of differences between means (variances) of treatment and control samples
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